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1 Abstract  
 
The process of globalisation has been boosted considerably by the application of information 
technology. Global communication and exchange of data have become everyday, almost 
trivial, phenomena. As a consequence of the globalisation of the modern world, the European 
Union and other international organisations have paid a lot of attention to harmonisation of 
legislation. These attempts, however, often seem to be concentrated on information 
technology itself rather than on the social problems that may have arisen from it. In IT law 
causes and consequences often appear to be blurred. The result of the, often very extensive, 
legislative initiatives does not fulfil its expectations.  
 
In this paper, a number of EU directives in the field of intellectual property will be discussed. 
It will be argued that, for example, the harmonisation of the intellectual property rights with 
respect to ‘chips’, software and databases, as well as the attempt to create a more general 
harmonisation of copyright, the ‘internet directive’, have led to more problems than were 
solved by them. Attempts to produce harmonisation in these fields have led to 
‘disharmonisation’, while the new social problems arising from globalisation have hardly 
been dealt with. The standard legal interpretation of concepts in one country is often different 
from that in another country, leading to differences in judicial decisions and legislation 
between countries.  
 
The conclusion is that although new technology may have caused social problems, 
international harmonisation of legislation should aim at the differences in national, social and 
legal approaches to these problems rather than at the technological changes that underlie 
them. If this would take place, such extensive attempts for harmonisation would most 
probably not be necessary.  
 
 
2 Globalisation and harmonisation of legislation  
 
Globalisation is closely connected to technology in general. Technology has been the cause 
for increased mobility in the past. Development of motorised traffic (the third step in 
technology development, more or less coinciding with the ‘industrial revolution’)1 has caused 
an enormous increase of mobility. Manifestations of this are for instance the huge migration 
waves at the beginning of the 20th century and after the Second World War, dormitory towns, 
going abroad for holidays and increasing international trade. Now, we see an increase in 
mobility again, caused by the development of automatic data processing (the fourth step in 
technology development, more or less coinciding with the ‘information revolution’). 
Information technology, including communication2, has made it possible that citizens all over 
the world can now become better informed, become more socially aware and migrate in a 
more determined way to countries with a higher level of prosperity, a higher standard of 
living and favourable conditions for settlement. Furthermore, information technology – and 
especially its interactive nature – has added a dimension to mobility, because cross-border 
contacts are now possible without the need of physical movement.  
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Especially with regard to the internet, questions about applicable legislation and problems 
with the enforcement of it play a role. This is particularly the case when network 
communication is used to exchange data files that are protected by intellectual property law. 
Two problems become apparent here. In the first place, the fact that data can be transported 
across national borders very easily leads to questions regarding harmonisation of legislation 
of the different countries. But the exchange of data files itself also touches the two essential 
aspects of the legal protection of these files, namely public performance and reproduction. 
 
Because of globalisation, it has become necessary to gain a more concrete hold on knowledge 
about other legislative systems than it used to be in a discipline like ‘comparative law’. 
Harmonisation, decreasing differences, seems preferable at first sight. This is what the 
European Commission intended for copyright and neighbouring rights, when it issued the 
2001 Copyright Harmonisation Directive3. The internet was mentioned as the immediate 
cause for this. This directive does not stand on its own, however, but relates to the WIPO 
Internet Treaties4, which in turn caused the introduction of the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998.5 Furthermore, it is not the first initiative to induce harmonisation in 
the field of intellectual property rights connected to information technology.6 In fact it is the 
most recent of a whole series of such initiatives that started with the US Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act of 1984.7 In the European Community this was followed by the 1987 Chips 
Directive8, the 1991 Software Directive9 and the 1996 Database Directive.10 Furthermore, 
harmonisation of software patents is now the subject of vivid discussions.11 This large number 
of initiatives leads to the question what exactly was harmonised, however, and what the result 
of all this is.  
 
 
3 Intellectual property rights  
 
Starting in the 1980’s, legislation regarding intellectual property rights has been altered 
considerably by the explicit inclusion of information society products, such as computer 
hardware (chips), computer software and computer data. This includes changes in copyright 
law (software) and new ‘sui generis’ legislation that resembles copyright law in many respects 
(chips, databases). Surprisingly, internet domain names is a field where this type of legislation 
is still missing.12 In the following sections we will pay attention to the necessities and benefits 
of these results of European harmonisation urge.  
 
 
3.1 Chips protection law  
 
When we look at the general requirement for protection under copyright law, there was of 
course no real need for the US SCPA 1984. Chips and in particular the three-dimensional 
pattern (topography) of the semiconductor, consisting of a stack of (two-dimensional) masks 
that contain the circuit patterns could easily be classified as an ‘original intellectual creation’ 
and therefore be protected under copyright law.13 To make this even clearer, the SCPA is in 
fact a lot more elaborate than necessary. Instead of just extending the definitions paragraph – 
as had been done for computer programs in 198014 – a whole new chapter 9 was added to the 
US Copyright law. Therefore, the most important reason for drafting this sui generis 
legislation does not seem to be the lack of protection in the US itself, but rather that in many 
other countries without sufficient copyright protection regimes or enforcement. Actually, 
large quantities of American chips were reproduced illegally in South East Asia in those days, 
whereas local authorities seemed reluctant to act against this practice. This frustrated the 
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Americans, even more so because they would have to protect chips from these countries 
against counterfeits themselves, under US copyright law.  
 
The original copyright basis of the US SCPA can still be recognised. Chapter 9, however 
contains one remarkable novelty. The principle of ‘assimilation’ or ‘national treatment’, basic 
assumption of the Berne Convention and of the Universal Copyright Convention,15 is dropped 
and is replaced by the principle of reciprocity. Under the new legislation, the US do not 
automatically grant foreign chips manufacturers the same rights as US manufacturers. This is 
now dependant on the level of protection that the particular country grants to US-made chips.  
 
This makes the US SCPA primarily an instrument for economic politics, specifically to urge 
‘clone countries’ to adopt an equivalent protection scheme for US chips, on penalty of losing 
protection in the US. ‘If you don’t protect us, we will not protect you.’ This is understandable; 
however, it is difficult to imagine that the US would benefit from regulations that would have 
the overall result that chips would no longer be protected. It seems desirable that everyone 
would eventually join the team. Given that objective, it can be easily understood why it was 
necessity – and not a favour – that led the US to include (the market of) the European Union 
in this protection scheme for the time of a six month (later even extended to a year) period of 
transition, during which European legislation could be modified to match American demands.  
 
The ‘chips law’ – the 1984 US SCPA, the 1986 EC directive following it and (in The 
Netherlands) the ‘1987 Chips Protection Act’16 – is therefore in a way ‘superfluous’, although 
it was necessary to circumvent the assimilation principle in existing international copyright 
treaties. Creating an exclusive position for chips was probably a more attractive alternative to 
the United States than to re-negotiate or to renounce existing treaties. The way in which this 
legislative solution was chosen unilaterally, given all its extraterritorial effects, is an example 
of the influence the US have in the field of IT regulation. The act also marks a change in the 
relationship between the US and the EU, which now seems to be increasingly based on trade 
protectionism. The principle of reciprocity has become the foundation of the EC 1996 
Database Protection Directive (article 11), the exhaustion rule has been limited to specimen 
that are sold for the first time within the EU (article 4 under c 1991 Software Protection 
Directive, article 5 under c and article 7.2 under b 1996 Database Protection Directive and 
article 4.2 2001 Copyright Harmonisation Directive) and trademark law has become a means 
to act against so-called parallel import. This does not look like harmonisation driven by 
globalisation; it bears more resemblance to diversification.  
 
 
3.2 Software law – copyright  
 
It is not hard to continue along these lines of critique: the special regime that was created to 
protect software was unnecessary too. The 1991 EC directive on software protection was the 
result of an intensive lobby by several interest groups from the computer industry. One of the 
most remarkable characteristics of the directive is the introduction of a legal status for 
‘temporary reproductions’ of a computer program, as part of the loading, displaying, running, 
transmission or storage of the program. These, in fact, are no ‘reproductions’, or ‘copies’, in 
the sense of copyright at all. What the article refers to is the practice of data processing.17 This 
has been the basis for widespread discussions about the silent extension of copyright law to 
cover not only ‘exploitation rights’, but also ‘usage rights’ and about the growing inequality 
between the rights of users and those of rightful claimants. But in the shadow of this 
discussion this incidental technical circumstance, that data must be processed in order for an 
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information system to work, has been used to include a legal limitation to competition that is 
without precedent in intellectual property law, namely a ban on reverse engineering. Article 6 
of the 1991 EC directive prohibits the decompilation of computer programs, except where this 
is “indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with other programs”. 
 
Decompilation (translating a program’s object code back to source code) is considered to be a 
‘reproduction’ in the sense of copyright law under the EC directive. The exception that was 
made was a small concession to the lobby for the preservation of free research to the structure 
and working of computer software. And even this exception is limited explicitly by the 
condition that the obtained information may not “be used for the development, production or 
marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its expression” – a fully unnecessary 
condition, as prohibiting copyright infringement by products that have a strong resemblance 
to certain original work is the main objective of copyright law. Copyright law is not meant for 
the protection of underlying ideas and principles (article 1.2 EC directive), but that is exactly 
what is established by the restriction of decompilation. This is even more perplexing as patent 
law (and chips law) explicitly include the possibility of reverse engineering.  
 
The concession with regard to compatibility is regarded as being a logical extension of the 
consideration of the directive with respect to the promotion of international standardization. If 
this should be the task of a government is questionable and depends, among other things, on 
the applicable political model and the assumption that steering society with such tools is 
feasible. This, however, does not fit very well in the rational model of man,18 which favours 
the free-market system and a government that limits itself to its classical tasks. Economic 
theory indicates that protecting standards might encourage innovation, but public utility 
would benefit more from a government that avoids this. Furthermore, this type of legislation 
with regard to such a general purpose product as computer software lacks refinement. 
 
With respect to the consideration in the directive referring to computer program technology 
being of “fundamental importance for the Community’s industrial development” the directive 
appears to be counter-productive, as most software standards stem de facto from the United 
States. The directive ‘condemns’ software developers from the EU to develop only software 
that is compatible with these standards, a sure way to increase the dominance of US 
manufacturers even more. With respect to this, it is ironic that Microsofts dominant position is 
questioned more in the EC than in the US, while Microsoft has succeeded all by itself in 
doing what the EC directive intends, namely to set international standards. 19
 
A much more powerful alternative to Microsoft’s prominent position seems to come from the 
industry itself, however, in the form of the ever growing ‘open source movement’.20 Under 
the title of ‘open source’, software is developed, the source code of which may be provided to 
other parties for further development. Certain provisions might be applied, such as the 
condition that the source code of a further developed version must in turn be made available 
to others.21 For this new business model, the benefit of the EC directive is again questionable. 
Open source software is not the same as software without applicable copyrights, or software 
for which copyright is not claimed. As a matter of fact, copyright is used to secure the 
availability of the programs source code, as well as the possibility to copy the program freely. 
This means that copyright is just as much a necessity for the open source business model as it 
is for the traditional protection model. Open source software is not free, companies earn 
money with it. The market for this type of software is more competitive, however, because 
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there are more players and customers are not dependant on just one or a few software 
developers. 
 
What can be learned from the rise of the open source movement is that society benefits from a 
manifold system with several options and standards that are left to the discretion of the 
market. Especially the latter seems to be something the EU is not yet quite accustomed to; its 
website now contains a guidance section on free and open source.22  
 
 
3.3 Software law – patents  
 
An initiative that was also launched under the flag of harmonisation but is still unsuccessful is 
the directive on the patentability of computer programmes.23 Under article 52 (c) of the 
European Patent Convention “programs for computers” are not regarded as inventions within 
the meaning of paragraph 1 of the convention. That does not mean that it is currently 
impossible to obtain patent protection for computer programs. They can be patented as a 
method of operation or as a product, however only in connection to hardware.24  
 
The special position of software in European patent law is strongly related to the difficulties 
faced in qualifying software for legal purposes. The text of article 52 dates back to 1973, 
when computer programs were qualified in terms of ‘instructions’ and other abstract 
notions.25 In his PhD thesis, Kleve discusses the legal qualification of computer data 
(including software) extensively. Based on a comprehensive analysis of legal and factual 
notions, he concludes that computer data, defined as concrete patterns that can contain 
information, should be qualified as ‘goods’ factually as well as legally. This means that data, 
just like other goods, can be someone’s property. The English summary of the applicable 
chapter 6 of this thesis, ‘The proprietary status of data’, states it as follows:26
 
“To determine if data are ‘goods’ depends upon whether data are tangible objects, whether they are capable 
of being controlled by people and whether they are objects with an economic value. Although it is 
conceivable that there are tangible objects that cannot be controlled by people, vice versa is not so likely: 
that there are things controllable by humans, which are not tangible. The fact that data can be controlled by 
humans, and they can be produced, processed, stored and transferred indicates in itself that data are tangible 
objects and of value to people.  
Data are not rights but nonetheless they can be the object of rights. Data do not belong to the world of ideas.  
With respect to whether data are tangible objects, it appears that insights from physics play a role, although 
not always a decisive one. In general, there appears to be three schools of thought:  
1. data are intangible and therefore not goods;  
2. data may well be intangible but in practice they are always connected to a carrier which is tangible;  
3. if physics does not consider data to be tangible, then tangible has to be interpreted in legal terms.  
The question is very relevant, particularly because of electronic data processing. In the case of magnetised 
plastic disks, the magnetic fields are sometimes categorised as physical and sometimes not.  
Otherwise than is suggested above, that the legal status of digital, electronic data determines the desirability 
of a ‘digital regime’, it seems that the desirability of a ‘digital regime’ is decisive for the legal status of 
digital, electronic data.  
 
The idea that the tangibility criterion based on physics should stand in the way of categorising data as 
‘goods’, cannot be supported by insights from physics. Experience points rather to the opposite conclusion: 
that as our knowledge of nature grows, more and more natural phenomena can be controlled by humans. 
Technology plays an important role in this respect. The tangibility of matter is not disputed. That gasses 
could be ‘goods’ was hardly conceivable in the time of the Romans, but when gases could be stored in 
bottles ideas changed. Energy became a legal object when energy became transferable, it could be 
accumulated and made available. Just as the increased controllability of energy characterises the third stage 
of technological development, the fourth stage of development is characterised by the increasing 
controllability of data.  
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Opting for a ‘digital regime’ could be explained in that other legal consequences would be desirable. 
However, that does not appear to be the case. Within the realm of private law, data files are sold and 
delivered, whereas the criminal law takes action against the illegal copying of another’s data. The legal 
consequences connected to the status of ‘goods’ also appear to be equally desirable for data.” 
 
When it is accepted that data are tangible object, just like other ‘goods’, and that abstract 
notions of computer programs (‘instructions’, ‘methods’) are represented physically in data, 
corresponding to the requirements for the patentability of other ‘inventions’, the special 
attention to computer programs in article 52 is plainly unnecessary. For it is the 
implementation of an ‘invention’ that can be the object of patent law protection, not the idea 
or the concept. This is of importance to the secondary discussion about the desirability of 
computer software patents. Why should an arbitrary product category that would otherwise 
qualify completely for patent law protection be excluded from it? This is a question that 
touches the very foundations of patent law. 
 
 
3.4 Database law  
 
The 1996 EC Database Protection Directive contains a complex regime of copyright 
protection for original databases as well as a sui generis protection for databases built with 
substantial investments. It is definitely not the case, however, that databases were completely 
without protection before the introduction of this directive. When personal choices of its 
maker had played a role while compiling or arranging the database, it was protected under the 
Berne Convention, specifically as a ‘collection’ or compilation. In many countries, however, 
even databases without such originality characteristics were granted legal protection, for 
instance by means of regulations against unfair competition or regulations based on printers 
law.27  
 
More recent case law on the subject seems to indicate that new terms like ‘database’ and 
criteria like ‘substantial investment’ can still raise questions, however. Many of these would 
not have surfaced under the general copyright regime and with the broader term ‘works’. It is 
feasible, however, that for a database that does not conform to the criteria of the directive the 
general copyright regime or some other ‘old’ protection regulation would still apply.  
 
Meanwhile, the directive continues with quite a number of systematic breaks with existing 
regulations. For instance, the unfortunate novelty that temporary, ‘technical’ reproductions 
fall under the reproduction right of the copyright holder, as introduced in the 1991 Software 
Protection Directive, is also adopted in the database directive. This means that also this 
directive not simply covers ‘exploitation’ of databases, but also their ‘use’. Furthermore, the 
directive was used by the EU to retaliate the US for the way in which chips protection had 
been enforced, now using the reciprocity principle itself and limiting exhaustion to the EU. 
Other new points are that protection is now granted to the manufacturer of the database (and 
not to the maker)28 and that the duration of protection seems to be practically unlimited.  
 
 
3.5 Internet law  
 
The 2001 Copyright Harmonisation Directive is the third directive in a row in which a legal 
status is granted to ‘temporary reproductions’. The EC view on temporary reproductions 
(which are, in fact, not reproductions at all, but merely electronic data processing), as 
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established in the 1991 Software Protection Directive and the 1996 Database Protection 
Directive, has also been applied in the ‘internet directive’, be it in a different way. The 
temporary reproduction in this case is no longer allowed to the legitimate user, as in article 
5.1 of the software directive and article 6.1 of the database directive, but has been excluded 
entirely from the applicability of the right to reproduce.29 What has been added to it is a test 
for economic value and the so-called ‘three step test’ from article 13 of the TRIPS Treaty and 
article 10.2 of the WIPO Treaty, regarding the admissibility of exceptions.30  
 
The purpose of the directive is to harmonise copyright law in the EU. The importance of this 
seems to be high, as it is even reflected in the title of the directive. Unlike prior directives, in 
which separate product categories were paramount (chips, software and databases, 
respectively), this directive was meant to establish an overall harmonisation of copyright law, 
necessitated by the growing importance of the internet (“the information society”). This 
expectation, however, has certainly not been fulfilled. It all starts promising, with the re-
codification of the “Reproduction right”, the “Right of communication to the public” and the 
“Distribution right” in articles 2-4. This, however, is mere window dressing – and even rather 
confusing, in this directive – as basic copyrights have already been anchored in the 
international copyright treaties. After this, the directive proves to be a patchwork of separate 
harmonisation subjects that can or can not be implemented in national legislation, all to the 
discretion of the individual member states.31 Existing differences between member states are 
not eliminated at all. Even the hottest, most urgent subject, namely ‘home copying’,32 is not 
regulated as “Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations”.33  
 
Furthermore, the directive specifically pays attention to the use of technical protective 
measures and to information about rights management (Digital Rights Management Systems), 
with the obligation to implement adequate legal protection against the circumvention of 
technological measures, against devices that are primarily designed, produced, adapted or 
performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating this circumvention and against the 
removal or alteration of any electronic rights-management information. It remains to be seen 
if this will end ‘the war on private copying’, or that on the contrary it will even intensify this 
war. 
 
Under the existing copyright regimes, it is not always clear whether current exceptions to 
copyright, which allow reproduction for private, non-commercial use, are applicable on the 
internet. As far as home copying is allowed, it will also include copying of music and films 
from the internet. The question is, however, whether or not the making available of files by 
the one, for reproduction by the other, is to be considered as being ‘communication to the 
public’. As for the latter, an exception ‘for private use’ is of course difficult to imagine. A 
common opinion about this is that ‘putting something on the internet’ is equivalent to making 
it available to the public. This can already yield copyright infringement, even without 
someone actually viewing it. This opinion requires some refinement, however. It is not 
uncommon to speak about the internet in a metaphorical way, but it is not an entity one can 
‘put something on’. The data resides on someone’s computer and therefore the question is 
how this person provides the data to others. When a user enables someone else, on this 
person’s request, to make a copy for personal use of a music file that resides on the user’s 
computer, this is probably not ‘communication to the public’. Based on the theory of 
exhaustion, the rightful claimant can not oppose the continued distribution of copies, after 
these have legitimately been brought into circulation. Publicly offering a musical work for 
download, for instance through a website, initiated by the ‘supplier’, possibly could be 
characterised as an infringement of the right of public communication. In the case of so-called 
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peer-to-peer copying of music or movies, however, a file is only copied after someone 
requests this. In this case, the initiative lies with the requester. In response to this request, the 
person is granted access to the respective musical work or the movie on the computer where it 
resides, after which he can make a ‘home copy’.34 This situation seems different from the one 
in which musical works are ‘offered’. Furthermore, this particular way of transferring a file 
must be distinguished from situations in which the counterpart of downloading (the actual 
copying) is qualified as ‘uploading’. It is not uncommon to use the term ‘uploading’ in 
situations where someone actively copies a data file from his computer to another computer, 
with the intention that others can then copy this file for themselves, which activity is called 
downloading. In a peer-to-peer situation this is not applicable. The file continues to reside on 
the original computer, for use on that computer. An extra activity that could be characterised 
as ‘uploading’ does not take place nor is the file ‘uploaded’ by the original possessor to the 
computer of the other person. 
 
But even if we accept that making home copies over the internet falls under the copyright 
exception, it is still a fact that the huge scale on which this home copying takes place – made 
possible by the scaling up that was caused by computer technology – was unforeseen. It is not 
a new problem, however; the ‘personal use’ exception is not so much a fundamental one but 
rather one that is unavoidable. Home copying is not caused by the copyright exception, nor is 
this exception the product of a fundamental notion about the ‘freedom of information’; it is 
the other way around. Because home copying became possible (starting in the 1960s and 
1970s with ‘home taping’ on tape recorders and audio cassettes) the copyright exception was 
introduced, whereas now it is regularly justified in terms of ‘freedom to copy’.35
 
Another important point for criticism seems to be the ambiguity of the directive. It offers the 
possibility to set limitations to the reproduction right, with regard to private copies. This 
implies that a person is entitled to grant someone else access to the files on his computer in 
order to copy these files for personal use. It is also allowed to ask someone from a distance if 
he possesses a certain musical work. But the directive does not explicitly state if it is allowed 
for someone to grant a person access from a distance to that same music file, even thought the 
file sharing programs that do exactly this in practice give rise to the largest number of legal 
questions. 36
 
Therefore, the question is still open how file exchange through file sharing programs on 
internet should be characterised. Article 5.2(b) states that “Member States may provide for 
exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right provided for in Article 2 for non-
commercial reproductions for private use”. Based on article 5.4 they may provide similarly 
for an exception or limitation to the right of distribution as referred to in Article 4 to the 
extent justified by the purpose of the authorised act of reproduction. The question, therefore, 
seems to be whether granting somebody access to a data file on a computer, for the purpose of 
making a non-commercial private copy by that person, falls under the right of distribution, or 
falls under the right of public communication. In the first case it may be allowed under the 
limitation of article 5.4, whereas in the second case it is not allowed.  
 
At first sight, it seems that granting someone access to a certain file that person has asked for 
falls under the right of communication to the public. But this is not self-evident, as ‘making 
available to the public’ covers forms of the material ‘making available’ as well as forms of 
the immaterial ‘making available’. What we have here is the distinction between the separate 
right to distribution or making available of copies, and the separate right of public 
performances or public broadcasting. The latter includes the making available to the public of 
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works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them. Such interactive on-demand transmissions should not be 
stretched beyond the domain of (commercial) interactive internet ‘radio’ or internet 
‘television broadcasting’, beyond the domain of ‘view-on-demand’. If electronic data 
distribution (electronic data delivery) is brought under the regime of ‘public communication’, 
every sensible distinction from the distribution regime vanishes. In that case, the theory of 
exhaustion could also be dumped. 
 
The considerations for the directive contain a further explanation of the right to make 
available to the public (consideration 23): 
 
„(23) […]This right should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire or 
wireless means, including broadcasting. This right should not cover any other acts.”  
 
This is the implementation of article 8 of the 1996 WIPO copyright treaties of Geneva, in 
which ‘immaterial publication’ over the internet – for instance the broadcasting of radio or 
television content – including ‘view-on-demand’ are also included under the right of 
publication. With regard to on-demand transmissions over networks consideration 25 states:  
 
„(25) The legal uncertainty regarding the nature and the level of protection of acts of on-demand 
transmission of copyright works and subject-matter protected by related rights over networks should be 
overcome by providing for harmonised protection at Community level. It should be made clear that all right 
holders recognised by this Directive should have an exclusive right to make available to the public copyright 
works or any other subject matter by way of interactive on-demand transmissions. Such interactive on-
demand transmissions are characterized by the fact that members of the public may access them from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them.”  
 
Regarding the right of distribution consideration 28 states: 
 
„(28) Copyright protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right to control distribution of the 
work incorporated in a tangible article. The first sale in the Community of the original of a work or copies 
thereof by the right holder or with his consent exhausts the right to control resale of that object in the 
Community. This right should not be exhausted in respect of the original or of copies thereof sold by the 
right holder or with his consent outside the Community. […].”  
 
The explanatory text given with these considerations yields some remarkable findings. Firstly, 
even after reading consideration 23 it is still unclear if the ‘immaterial regime of publication’ 
that is contained in the right to make available to the public also includes file sharing. 
Secondly, it seems that file sharing does not conform to the characteristic of ‘on demand 
transmissions’ in consideration 25, because with this technique the availability of a file is not 
determined by ‘members of the public’, but depends on the fact of someone else who 
possesses this file is on-line at that moment or not. In the third place, file sharing seems to fit 
in the regime of the right to distribute, because a work is involved that is incorporated in a 
tangible object. That electronic data files are tangible has already been argued above. 
Furthermore, in this case there is no transmission of a work in the sense that the work is 
played or displayed ‘on demand’, for instance in the form of streaming audio or streaming 
video, which if necessary could be ranked under ‘immaterial publication’, but there is a 
material copy that is made available in order that a private copy can be made of it. The most 
remarkable point, in the fourth place, is, however, that it seems that the text is not meant this 
way. This could be concluded from consideration 29, in which cd-rom and cd-i disks are 
mentioned “where the intellectual property is incorporated in a material medium, namely an 
item of goods”, together with “on-line services” in which the Commission possibly also 
includes ‘on-line delivery’.  
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This is not only remarkable from the – incorrect – assumption that electronic files are not 
made available physically over the internet. It is especially remarkable because it would lead 
to an unworkable regime for home copying in peer-to-peer situations. It would have been far 
better to accept a general copyright exception for private copies. As it is now, the directive 
would make no difference to the situation prior to it. Furthermore, the ‘three step test’ in 
article 5.5 complicates matters. It states that exceptions are only allowed in certain specific 
cases, under the conditions that the normal exploitation of works is not affected and that legal 
interests of right holders are not deteriorated unreasonably. 
 
Given the time that the WIPO internet treaties were drafted, in December 1996, file sharing 
was probably not an issue during the discussions. The internet, as a new medium, had to be 
given the same status, as far as copyright was concerned, as transmissions by air and by cable. 
Still, developments or rather experiments regarding interactive broadcasting such as pay per 
view and view on demand already took place at that time. This brings us to an important 
reason not to treat file sharing and view on demand in the same way. View on demand is 
possible because of the interactive character of the internet. Therefore, music and movies need 
not be broadcasted publicly at fixed moments anymore, like is the case with radio and 
television, but can be listened to or viewed at any moment, chosen by the listener or viewer. 
The specific attention that is paid to view on demand is based on the consideration that it 
could possibly not be regarded as public display, because every time the public only consists 
of one person. In that case individual on-demand transmissions would not be covered by 
copyright law, even if it would concern the commercial exploitation of copyrighted works. 
The situation is in fact comparable to the exhibition of movies in private video cabins. The 
Court of Appeal in The Hague, the Netherlands, considered this as ‘public display’, the 
making available of a work to multiple people, even if it is only observed by a single (or not 
even a single) person37. The important difference is here, however, that view on demand is a 
form of commercial exploitation whereas file sharing is a non-commercial form of home 
copying. 
 
Should attacking home copiers be the objective, this could also be achieved by the protection 
regime that is suggested for the circumvention of technological measures.38 Here again, the 
directive fails because no choice is made. If technical provisions would be adequate against 
copying, it would not be necessary to make an exception for private copying. Technical 
protection was developed because legal protection was inadequate. If, however, technical 
protection also proves to be inadequate, it is not very likely that legal protection of technical 
protection will help us out. Still, this is exactly what the directive does. It seems to take into 
account that technological measures will not work, as it includes regulations for the legal 
protection of these measures. Therefore, it only shifts the problem to a more complicated 
level.39  
 
This approach bears a strong resemblance to the approach of the problem of home copying. 
Initially, home copying, for instance from radio broadcasts on a tape recorder, led to the 
exception for private use – although reluctantly – because nothing could be done against that. 
As technology made it easier to make home copies and the number of home copies grew, the 
resistance against the private use exception from the side of the information industry grew as 
well. As it seems, the amounts are now so high that industry longs back to the situation prior 
to 1960, even though at that time it was the inability to act against home copying that led to 
the introduction of the exception. 
 
 10
Instead of banning the circumvention of technological measures,40 it would be a better idea to 
harmonise the grounds for home copy levys. Netanel41 goes very far in this respect with the 
suggestion that a so-called ‘null levy’ (or non commercial use levy) should be imposed on 
consumer products and services of which the value is substantially raised because of peer-to-
peer file sharing. Examples of such products and services are internet access, P2P software 
and services, computer hardware, consumer electronics usable for the copying, storing, 
sending or playing of ‘downloaded’ files (like cd-burners, mp3 players and digital video 
recorders) and the recording media used in these devices. It is up to the information industry, 
however, to make the first move here, with the development of new business models. 
 
Some authors42 have stated that copyright is no longer necessary, because there are other, 
more effective ways to protect information products. We can not agree with this point of 
view, however. Copyright provides a foundation based on which authors and other right 
holders are entitled to a fee.43 Commercial exploitation of works is not so difficult to assess, 
because some publicity is needed for it. But as a mechanism to allocate private consumption, 
copyright will not always be sufficient in a digital environment. In those cases, it seems 
obvious that statutory copyright levys will gain importance, as will collective licensing bodies 
that supervise these. From this perspective too, the legal protection of technological measures 
can be criticized, as the use of technical provisions is taken into account while establishing 
what is a ‘fair compensation’ for authors. The only party that seems to benefit from that are 
suppliers of technical protection and DRMS. It would be more sensible to pay attention to the 
rather monopolistic character of collective licensing bodies and to improve supervision on the 
functioning of these organisations.  
 
 
4 Harmonisation? 
 
The argument to improve harmonisation is an important one. Differences between legislation 
in the countries of the European Union that impede trans border trade are contradictory to the 
aims of the Union. Furthermore, it is understandable that legislative initiatives emerge at the 
level of the Union when new developments seem to be incompatible with existing legislation. 
 
As regards copyright law, countries that have joined the international copyright treaties, such 
as the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, TRIPS and the WIPO treaties, 
should have adjusted their national legislation in agreement with these. Harmonisation in the 
EU to a large extend has been provided by these treaties. Because the EU member states have 
ratified the Berne Convention, there does not seem to be a role for the EU for this.44  
 
The German ‘Inkasso-case’,45 has sometimes been cited to illustrate the fact that the level of 
copyright protection is not the same in all EU member states. This case, however, seems 
simply a mistake. It is hardly imaginable that accounting software and some other types of 
computer programs would stay without copyright protection just because they are judged not 
to be sufficiently original.46 If harmonisation would be the main objective, it would be more 
appropriate to define certain criteria, such as the criterion of originality that in Germany is 
indeed interpreted more strictly than for instance in The Netherlands, at the Union level. Not 
just for software or databases, but on a general basis.47, 48 That was not the point of departure, 
however, in the Green Paper on Copyright that preceded the software directive.49 This paper 
states that the Commission would focus on aspects that might form obstacles for the free flow 
of goods and services and would abstain from so-called ‘horizontal legislation’. The 2001 
Copyright Harmonisation Directive, however, goes a lot further than would be necessary for 
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joining the WIPO treaties but does not lead to harmonisation in the Union because of the large 
number of optional regulations and conditions. 
 
While the harmonisation that could be the result of the EC directives discussed here is 
therefore probably limited, disharmonisation effects could be considerable. 
 
With regard to semiconductors, we have seen that an arbitrary ‘intellectual creation’ was 
taken from the domain of copyright because of legal, political and economic reasons. This 
product was then provided with a sui generis regime, giving up the principle of ‘national 
treatment’ from the Berne Convention.  
 
With regard to computer programs, databases and ‘internet harmonisation’, copyright is 
stretched almost carelessly, by now also including the use – reading, listening, watching – as 
part of copyright. The way computers function – more specific the data processing 
functionality – has been used as a ground for this. To label the data processing functionality, 
as if this were self-evident, as ‘copying’ seems to indicate that not all legislators are 
completely familiar with the field of information technology; or with the field of copyright 
law. This whole approach already constitutes a systematic breach in copyright law. The 
implementation of the 2001 Copyright Harmonisation Directive, however, again constitutes a 
systematic breach with it. 
 
To top it off, computer programs and databases are the only two products that have been 
excluded categorically from the private use exception. Furthermore, the ban on reverse 
engineering of computer programs – a form of legal protection that even forbids studying a 
product – constitutes a limitation in competition law that is without precedent in the whole 
field of intellectual property law. Another strange point and a source of disharmonisation is 
that computer programs are still not understood well enough to grant them the protection of 
patent law. The reason that is given for this is still the incomprehensible notion that computer 
programs would not be tangible. 
 
Finally, harmonisation does not seem to contribute much to the solution of concrete societal 
questions. The specific attention that has been given to computer programs and databases has 
not been able to stop illegal copying, at least not in a way that could not have been achieved 
with general copyright law. With regard to the legal protection of databases it even seems that 
the new directive has made things worse, as the term ‘database’ gives rise to more discussions 
than the term ‘work’ in copyright. The harmonisation of copyright in the information society, 
that was initiated by the WIPO treaties of 1996, until now has not led to a uniform approach 
of peer-to-peer file sharing, and certainly not to a solution with respect to this.50 The 
memorable sigh of judge Stearns in the LaMacchia case – “It is not clear that making 
criminals of a large number of consumers of computer software is a result that even the 
software industry would consider desirable” – seems to have only gained importance.51
 
 
5 Conclusions  
 
Differences in legislation are a reality, just like the existence of differences in societal views 
and norms. Of course, it might be ideal if the world were one constitutional state. But since 
the setup of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 the achievements in 
this respect, even in Europe alone, have been limited. We can conclude that new problems in 
society can emerge because of applications of information technology, but multi-lateral 
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harmonisation of legislation should rather concentrate on differences in which these problems 
are treated than on differences in which information technology is treated. The question how 
to harmonise legal concepts is far less urgent than the question how legal notions should be 
interpreted in relation to technical notions. Differences in legal systems and differences in the 
legal interpretation of certain concepts, based on national legal dogmatism, can form huge 
obstacles for genuine harmonisation of legislation. Therefore, international consultation and 
cooperation in the field of law enforcement are a better approach. It could then be that 
extensive harmonisation is found to be less essential than the abundance of new regulations 
seems to suggest.  
 
However, if harmonisation is chosen, it would be sensible to realise that if home copying was 
impossible to control in the time of cumbersome tape recorders, it will be even more difficult 
to do this in the time of the information super highway and moreover, that it is not even 
desirable to do this. In a community that evolves into an information society, nobody wants 
governors that take them back to 1950.  
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